@article{10.1145/3431233,
author = {Aliwa, Emad and Rana, Omer and Perera, Charith and Burnap, Peter},
title = {Cyberattacks and Countermeasures for In-Vehicle Networks},
year = {2021},
issue_date = {January 2022},
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
address = {New York, NY, USA},
volume = {54},
number = {1},
issn = {0360-0300},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3431233},
doi = {10.1145/3431233},
abstract = {As connectivity between and within vehicles increases, so does concern about safety and security. Various automotive serial protocols are used inside vehicles such as Controller Area Network (CAN), Local Interconnect Network (LIN), and FlexRay. CAN Bus is the most used in-vehicle network protocol to support exchange of vehicle parameters between Electronic Control Units (ECUs). This protocol lacks security mechanisms by design and is therefore vulnerable to various attacks. Furthermore, connectivity of vehicles has made the CAN Bus vulnerable not only from within the vehicle but also from outside. With the rise of connected cars, more entry points and interfaces have been introduced on board vehicles, thereby also leading to a wider potential attack surface. Existing security mechanisms focus on the use of encryption, authentication, and vehicle Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), which operate under various constraints such as low bandwidth, small frame size (e.g., in the CAN protocol), limited availability of computational resources, and real-time sensitivity. We survey and classify current cryptographic and IDS approaches and compare these approaches based on criteria such as real-time constraints, types of hardware used, changes in CAN Bus behaviour, types of attack mitigation, and software/ hardware used to validate these approaches. We conclude with mitigation strategies limitations and research challenges for the future.},
journal = {ACM Comput. Surv.},
month = {mar},
articleno = {21},
numpages = {37},
keywords = {CAN bus, cybersecurity, intrusion detection systems}
}